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PHILOSOPHY AND THE FUTURE LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULUM
BY JAMES E. WALLACE*

T

HE PLACE of philosophy in the future law school curriculum

must be viewed in the context of the changes that are occurring
in the social and political structure within which lawyers practice and
the consequent changes in the legal profession itself. This context has been discussed by Wilbert E. Moore' and Robert B. Yegge2
and the comments that follow are premised upon their discussions.
Dean Yegge indicates that a hallmark of the current situation
is man's increasing mastery of change, not only in reaction to it but
also in the creation of changes deemed necessary or desirable to attain
certain goals, short and long range, and in the potential that man
now may set the direction for his future. Human power in decision
making coupled with the rapidity of change seems to compress time
- the future becomes but the short step of implementing plans made
in the present.
However, there may be surprises. Further, man is an historical
creature. He cannot deny or escape the past which provides the
matrix for his understanding of reality. Because he is a creature,
he cannot avoid philosophizing about the nature and purpose of
reality and human existence. The co-relation of man's historicity
and creatureliness emphasizes the relativity of his philosophy. Thus,
the legal realists of the early decades of the 20th century exposed
the shortcomings of a self-contained, logically consistent, fully integrated philosophical system of law which seemingly was independent
of those charged with its implementation. World Wars I and II
again put in question the resort to authority as the final test of the
right for the law. Man's dominion over his physical environment
has injected new dimensions into the means-ends problem. As a
result, the law today may be characterized as being in search of
norms for its proscriptions and prescriptions. This search drives its
inquirers to the more basic question, "What is the law?"
*Associate Professor of Law and Director of Professional Responsibility Program, University of Denver College of Law; A.B., University of California at Los Angeles,
1943; LL.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1949; B.D., Princeton Theological
Seminary, 1960; Th.D., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1965.
W. Moore, Changes in American Social Structure (paper prepared for Curriculum
Comm. Conference, Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Sept. 30, 1967), reprinted supra
at 1.
2 R. Yegge, The Future Legal Practitioner in the United States: What Training He
Must Receive (paper prepared for Curriculum Comm. Conference, Ass'n of Am. Law
Schools, Sept. 30, 1967), reprinted supra at 12.
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Set free from a prior philosophical underpinning which found
answers in the method of logic, and in quest for its identity and the
guidelines to direct the planned change which is within the purview
of lawmen, the law school is confronted with the fact of differentiation within the structure of the profession in American society. As
Moore has pointed out, specialization is the trend and collective
decision making the format for law practitioners in this society.
In the process, new tasks emerge and old skills become diluted.
The development of new tasks entails anticipation in the training of new skills. The dilution of old skills creates pressure to spin
off segments of the profession which can better be served by specially trained technicians. At the same time, a new perspective is
called for which enables the specialized-collectivized practitioner to
see the relation of his sphere of activity to the whole task and challenge of the profession in society lest he be lost in a sense of disengagement. Conforming to the niche of his speciality, he is subject
to pressure to become a professional "drop out."
Whereas the 18th century lawyer was seen as a legislator, and
whereas the 19th century viewed the lawyer as a judge, the 20th
century image of the lawman is in flux. The lawyer has been popularized as the advocate of justice and the rights of man by the mass
media. He has been characterized as an architect of order whose
task is to form the order for a changing society. He may also emerge
as an important go-between who mediates and manages tension.
Cast off from the solidarity of an all encompassing philosophy,
caught in the progression of specialization, and confronted with the
opportunity for change, the diagnosis of the place of philosophy in
the current law school curriculum is rather dismal. As stated in the
resolution presented to a section at the 1965 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,'
While individual scholars in many law faculties have pursued the
study of law as a theoretical, cultural discipline, the fact is th.t vocationalism tends to set the tone of the law schools - instruction in
numerous unorganized "courses," minute specialization in most of
them, lack of intellectual content in many of them that is usually
expected in university study, and emphasis on technical competence.
In this atmosphere scholarship is subordinated to standards of professional success; leadership both in scholarly contribution and in the
formation of public policies has been lost to other disciplines. Nonlegal scholars, however, are not equipped to meet the current challenge adequately. The fact is that the theoretical study of law has
fallen in neglect between the law schools' vocationalism and the lack
of legal training of social scientists, historians and philosophers.
3 Dorsey, Formationof American Section of InternationalAssociation for Philosophy of

Law and Social Philosophy, 18 J.

LEGAL

ED. 63 (1965).
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To pick up the theme of Yegge's remarks, how do we get from here
to there?
I. PHILOSOPHY AND CHANGE

It is tempting to place man at the helm of his destiny and frame
a philosophy of law based upon human perfectability and power to
determine the future. Scientific and technological advances seem to
bring this possibility within the closer range of probabilities. Each
step of progress, however, accentuates the necessity to consider anew
man's purpose in it all. In a time when means and goals are problematical, the need for guidance in the choice of alternatives becomes
more acute. When man both chooses the means to attain particular
goals and decides between several goals in relation to these means,
then the criteria for his decisions are of paramount concern for those
who follow in addition to those who lead.
If lawyers are to provide order in the context of change order that both contains that which is, and provides for that which
is becoming - then the lawmen will need a philosophy adequate for
the task. The inadequacy of any prior philosophical understanding
of the law does not require its being ruled inadmissible because
irrelevant, immaterial, and failing to prove or disprove an issue.
The analysis of the internal structure of law does not lose its importance. Nor is the question of sovereignty and power beside the
point. Also, it would be foolhardy to argue that the historical school
of legal philosophers added nothing to an understanding of the
nature of law. But these and other philosophical perspectives of the
law do not exhaust the demands upon a philosophy of law confronted by purposeful change.
A view of the law is called for which is broader than substantive rules and hierarchies of power. Habit, custom, and the mores
need to be kept within the framework of their relation to the jobs
performed by those who can be identified as law professionals. In
order to meet the challenge of change as now being understood, the
law must be conceived as more than the legal order, law rules, or
the judicial and administrative processes.' It must include the process
of ordering which is the special responsibility of lawyers. The concept of law is thereby turned to focus upon a particular way in which
socjal rclati-onships arc ordcred by identifiable actors who behave
within the limits of certain controls over them because of the things
they do and who thus have become accustomed to fairly well defined
expectations. Ordering in this sense includes the ideological dimension of activity which justifies requiring conformity to norms in social
4 This trilogy has been suggested by Roscoe Pound in many of his writings. See, e.g.,
Pound, Sociology of Law, in TWENTIETH CENTURY SOCIOLOGY 300 (G. Gurvitch &
W. Moore eds. 1945).
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relationships and also the initiation of new relational forms in the
search for the right. It is preservation and creation in relation to
certain ideals.
Within this perspective of the law, the lawman is conceived of
as more than a purveyor of rules, a channel in the system of legal
logic, an adjunct to an arm of political power, or a captive of his
geography and history. The lawman is a participant in an ordering
process which is directed toward the realization of higher objectives,
conscious and unconscious, realized and unrealized. As a participant
in this process, the lawman makes specific contributions toward the
relative fulfillment of goals through the particular arrangements he
devises, the rules he promulgates, the procedures he initiates, and
the policies he declares. He is the high priest in the process toward
order in the face of rapid change. As such he is in the position of
leadership which offers the prospect of influence over the actions
of others.
A caveat must be introduced in this discussion of change and
the potential for determination of the future by human effort. Man
is not perfect. He is finite and limited - as are his plans and predictions. In addition to the ubiquity of change which calls forth the
serious look ahead, man experiences the reality of an ubiquitous evil
as a source of strain which tends to produce change.' Moral man
lives in an immoral society.6 Ideals are not realized. Above all, man
has the freedom to cheat.' A philosophy of law which conceptualizes law as activity must therefore take seriously the imperfect
nature of the ordering process in which the lawmen participate.
The lawman as participant in the ordering process which is the
task of the law in American society will thus function within the
limits of tension between that which is and that which ought to be.
Such a lawman needs a view of the law which provides him with
understanding of his role-status within the law process and also with
the criteria for deciding among the various means and ends that are
viable options in getting from here to there.
II.

IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR NORMS

The question, "What is law?" is not new; nor is the search for
norms to guide the legal structuring of relationships of recent origin.
The new dimension for these questions is to pose them for an industrialized, bureaucratized, urbanized, secularized society. Philosophically and theologically the understanding of ultimate reality is
5 W. MOORE, SOCIAL CHANGE 19 (1963).

Moore uses the word "sin" which has cer-

tain theological connotations.
6 R. NEIBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932).
7 P. BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY 151-63

(1963).
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no longer an unquestioned given but one in which man in some
measure participates. His stance in creating reality is that of a
partner-with varying views regarding the identity of the other
members of the partnership. The ontological understanding of the
law is subject to like forces of relativity. Even the methodology of
law has been put in doubt. Holmes challenged the method of logic
as the life of the law in the late 19th century. The waters that were
then muddied have yet to clear. As has been argued, many of the
gaps in the lawyers' training are traceable to "an insulation from
reality . . . which unduly emphasizes the study of precedent." 8 Yet,
precedent has a place in the task of the law to structure the relationships of contemporary society, especially in a time when change so
accentuates the teleological questions which confront the lawmen
in this task.
These several issues are not discrete but are interrelated. They
are raised in a time when legal education is under close scrutiny as
a result of the changes that are occurring within society and the legal
profession. One change of particular note is the introduction of the
behavioral sciences to dialogue with law professionals and the implications of this dialogue for a philosophy of law. The gradual appearance of courses in law school curricula dealing with law in
process, law and society, anthropology of law, sociology of law, and
the like, signal subtle changes of outlook within the profession.
These courses may mark the initiation of a new concept into the
law, or they may reflect changes resulting from the evolution of the
idea of law. Be that as it may, attention to such subject matter and
the defense of its integrity in the law school curriculum are evidence
of a new look at the philosophy upon which the law has been taught
for the past generations and its adequacy for the present time.
Meaningful interchange between behavioral scientists interested
in the law and lawyers must be more than the refinement of tools
for the kit of the law practitioner and the suggestion of problems
which may be of interest to the student of society. This interchange
requires a new look at the nature of law and the sources for norms
which are given form in the ordering of the society. No longer is it
necessary to justify the dialogue between the disciplines. Rather, it is
time to look at the bases and the consequences of looking at the law
in terms of the behavior of people in relation to stated and assumed
ideals of law and the function and functionaries of law in society.
The interrelation of factors relevant to the introduction of a
behavioral science understanding of the law to the law school curriculum and the development of a philosophy of law sufficient to
undergird the task of law in a society marked by purposeful change
8 R. Yegge, supra note 2, at 21.
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is complex. It is not necessary to unravel the fabric of culture and
the accumulation of knowledge to recognize the increasing literature
based upon an attempt to understand what lawyers do and what the
law does in society. For example, Lon L. Fuller has sought to formulate a philosophy of law based upon a conceptualization of law as
activity and the legal system as the product of sustained purposive
effort.9 Fuller's schema is a "new" natural law. Although the term
"natural law" carries with it some unfortunate baggage from a prior
time, the attempt to articulate a natural law philosophy for the contemporary lawman is grounded upon an understanding of man in
social relationships and the elements of the human condition. Philip
Selznick has examined the foundations upon which to build a fruitful
collaboration between sociology and a natural law philosophy which
suggests that the data of human experience may provide a basis from
which norms may be formulated to guide action in the law ordering
of society. 10
Although still emerging and far from being free of debate and
doubt, the effort to formulate a philosophical understanding of law
which identifies law as process, as activity, as what is being done by
and within a group of practitioners in society is being made. Such
a philosophy is required not only as a response to the demands of
change and the invasion by behavioral scientists upon the sacrosanct
domain of the law tradition, but also to suggest the parameters for
that which is to come. Thus, as the lacunae between the claims of
the law and the behavior of people are exposed by systematic investigators, lawyers recognize that if they are to perform their tasks responsibly as high priests in ordering a better society, then they must
have a perspective consonant with the challenge and a new look at
the data of human experience.
Two aspects of the state of legal philosophy in relation to the
challenge of change to the law process have been considered - the
need for internal reconstruction and the consequences of external
contact with the behavioral sciences. External contact in the formulation of legal philosophy, however, cannot be limited to dialogue
with behavioral scientists. In the search for norms and the task of
sorting means and ends, lawmen also need to engage in conversation
with ethicists. Just as dialogue is now in process with behavioral
scientists, likewise bridges are needed for exchange with the professions which are engaged in the task of understanding values and
articulating norms for human behavior based upon those values.
9L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAw (1964). Fuller has written several items in this
field. For a critique, see Summers, Professor Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL
ED. 1 (1965).

10 Selznick, Natural Law and Sociology, in
(1962).

NATURAL LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 154
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No panacea will be found for initiating interchange between
law teachers and ethicists in all law schools. The addition of philosophers to law faculties, interdepartmental seminars for faculty
and students at universities, or specially convened workshops may
be answers for some law schools. Certainly, the experience gained
in the introduction of behavioral science concepts and materials into
law school curricula should be informative in these respects. In the
first instance, however, concerted attention must be focused upon
the needs for - and of - legal philosophy and the teaching of law.
The lawyer as high priest will not be all things to all men. He
will be a specialist serving the narrow aspects of a particular need
of some men. He will enlist cohorts in order fully to serve his client,
be the client an individual or group, an actual or a fictitious person.
How and where will the lawyer-specialist find the engagement which
provides meaning for the relationship of his part to the whole? How
and where will he be turned from vocationalism to a sense of the
profession which gives leadership in the creation of social order?
How and where will he see himself as more than a technician who
dispenses rules of law to financially acceptable clients?
There is no single answer to these questions. But there is one
experience common to all lawyers. All who are admitted by the
elders of the profession to the campfire of recognition must pass
through the halls of a law school. The law school is at the vortex
of the socialization process whereby the law neophyte is transformed
into the accepted professional. Therefore, the law school is in a
strategic position in the formation of the law-professional's understanding of the law, its purpose, and its potential.
III. THE LAW SCHOOL

AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

The law school, although strategic in the professionalizing
process, is caught in the midst of the failure of philosophy to provide a theory of law compatible with the demands upon it, the increasing pressure for specialized training to equip lawmen for the
tasks which they are called upon to fulfill, and the predicament of
being compelled to lay the foundations for an order yet to come out
of the uncertainty of the present situation.
The philosophy of law which supported the teaching and practice of lawmen for the past 50 years will not serve the next 50 years.
It is not altogether wrong; it was the creature of its time and was
not called upon to answer the questions which now perplex the law
professional. New knowledge, the power of man over his environment, the consequences of technological advance, and the pervasive-
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ness of an urban ethos are several of the factors which have revealed
the shortcomings of prior systems of legal philosophy. Yet, this
recognition does not automatically usher in a fully developed system
of thought to take up their places. Consequently, the law school
must teach lawmeri for the tasks now anticipated and given meaning by a philosophy that is still nascent.
Three observations are in order concerning the stance of the
law school in this position:
1. The law school has no choice concerning the philosophy
of law.
2. It must accept realistically its place within the structure
of the profession and not relegate its responsibilities to others.
3. It must maintain its freedom to seek out new ways to
inject philosophy into the profession.
A. The Lack of Choice
The law school has no choice in regard to a philosophy of law
in the sense that it can opt to ignore the problem and pretend that
its curriculum is philosophy-free. The law it teaches, the perspectives it inculcates in its students, the courses deemed relevant to be
taught, and the methods used in teaching them will reflect a philosophical point of view concerning the law. The absence of any concerted attention to legal philosophy as a scholarly discipline is no
test of whether a philosophy is being taught. Such absence may
more properly suggest a proliferation of legal philosophies.
The choice before the law school is to decide whether the philosophy which pervades its curriculum and teaching methods is sufficient for the task of the lawmen being prepared for service in the
light of the changing structures of society. It is necessary to appraise
the philosophical understanding of the nature of law which provides
the foundation for the law school subjects being taught, their content, and methods of teaching.
Unanimity of viewpoint among all law schools is neither expected nor desirable. The first step in becoming aware of the direction toward which the law and the law schools may be headed is to
look consciously at the philosophy of law now being proclaimed.
Thereby the stage can be set to examine critically the sufficiency of
viewpoints in the light of current knowledge.
Critical examination is but an initial step. To linger overly long
with institutional introspection is to detour the development of the
philosophy of law. It is incumbent upon the law schools to initiate
the study of law as it relates to and is one of the processes of change
now being observed.
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B. Law Schools and the Structure of the Profession
In responding to the hue and cry for a philosophy of law compatible with the reality of social relations now becoming, the law
schools must recognize and accept their place within the structure
of the profession. Their responsibility must not be relegated to others.
Two related ideas are involved in this injunction: The law school
as an organization of law teachers has a function which is distinct
from that of the law practitioners and more than "just teaching the
law"; and, the responsibility for providing leadership in the development of policy may shift by default from the law schools to the bar
associations.
The offering by a law school of studies in the law is conditioned
upon a legal philosophy. As argued above, integrity in teaching
requires realism regarding the philosophy which undergirds such
teaching.
However, the differentiation which marks the change in social
structures applies to the law schools. They are subject to the same
pressures for change as is the law practitioner. Specialization, urbanization, inequality, and pluralism 1 impinge upon and affect the law
school. It cannot divorce itself from history and plead immunity from
the forces of change.
One dimension of differentiation - specialization - has particular significance for the law schools. Among other characteristics,
the law school represents that segment of the legal profession which
is analogous to the board of directors of a manufacturing concern.
The teachers of the law are in a position to influence strongly law
policy. The place of the law journal and scholarly writing within
the profession of lawmen must be appreciated. They provide a communication network, formal and informal, for the exchange of ideas
and the initiation of change.
Consequently, in the market place of matters pertaining to the
law- its definition, function, and goals- the law school fulfills
a vital function in exploring new vistas and offering new ways of
thinking and acting. At a time when the law seeks to know itself
and to locate its bearings for future action, the teachers of law have
a peculiar opportunity and an especial responsibility to think through
and articulate the philosophy upon which they proceed.
Responsibility for the development of legal philosophy is not
the sole prerogative of the law teachers. It is patent that all lawyers
-be
they practicing attorneys, teachers, judges, or association administrators- function in relation to a philosophy of law and so
have some responsibility for its formulation. A legal philosophy
11 W. Moore, supra note 1.
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undergirds their livelihoods and therefore, it can be argued, should
be of concern to them. Responsibility in this general sense is important and hopefully more attention may be directed to it by all
law professionals.
The concern at this juncture is with the law schools and the
peculiar responsibility for a viable legal philosophy which is theirs
because of the place of the law school in the training of lawmen.
The existence of two organizations such as the Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar Association indicates that
the interests of the lawyers who identify with them respectively may
be distinguishable although allied in many respects. The growth of
the American Bar Association and its aggressiveness in the meeting
of new demands on the law may facilitate its assumption of leadership in developing a philosophy of law. Cooperation in the effort
would appear to be advisable and consideration should be given to
its enlistment. However, in the first instance the law schools are
confronted with the possibility that default in understanding the
nature and purpose of law from within their ranks may lead to a
growing subservience of the schools to the organized bar in regard
to the content of the law school curriculum and the philosophy which
pervades the teaching of law. There is merit in maintaining the
independence of the law school from the pressures of the organized
bar associations in order to preserve the freedom necessary to the
educational enterprise to permit experimentation and innovation.
C. The Need to be Free
The introduction into the law school curriculum of a philosophical view of law which conceptualizes law as process and seeks
norms from an examination of the conditions of human behavior,
when coupled with an increasing dialogue in depth with behavioral
scientists concerning the function of law and lawmen in society, may
open the door of a Pandora's Box, particularly if the law school
loses its freedom to experiment in course offerings and research.
The law school must retain the freedom which will enable it to
pursue the truth from the perspectives of the philosophy of law
which guides the curriculum and the areas of human behavior deemed
critical for study. Freedom is a relative term and its limits will vary
depending upon individual law schools. At least two freedoms are
necessary in regard to the revivification of legal philosophy in the
law school curriculum: the freedom to innovate, and the freedom
to become involved.
The law school needs the freedom to introduce new courses
into its curriculum without pressure from the organized bar toward
the preparation of student. for bar examinations. In the first place,
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preparation to pass the bar examinations can be offered in well
planned and executed bar review courses conducted in conjunction
with or independent of the law school program. Secondly, the determination of subjects deemed relevant to the practice of law is a
two-way street in which direction from the law schools to the organized bar is as essential as from the bar associations to the law
schools. In this connection, the law school should have the option
of changing the criteria for specifying the knowledge deemed to be
of primary importance in the practice of law.
Thus, a philosophy which stresses the process of law and involvement in this process by law professionals may suggest that
corporation law be viewed in terms of the locus and hierarchy of
control and its consequences for a free enterprise economy, for the
responsible use of natural resources, or for the distribution of purchasing power rather than in terms of the limits within legislative
enactments to which powers can be conferred upon the fictitious
entity called the corporation. Or, a course in contracts might focus
more upon the nature of the contract as a means of arranging relations and providing a private law to govern individuals than in terms
of offer and acceptance, consideration, performance, and the remedies for breach of contract. In addition, such a legal philosophy
may suggest that required courses be in history, philosophy, and the
legal process, leaving the electives to courses oriented toward learning
law rules necessary in the practice of law.
The freedom to innovate should include the new dimensions
of education now taking shape within the profession, for example,
continuing education. The possibilities for retooling and introducing
new ideas into the profession have yet to be exhausted within this
field of activity. The format and content of specific courses offered
to practicing lawyers will reflect a legal philosophy; a change in
philosophy will require a change in the courses.
A third area for innovation is suggested by the programs conducted at law schools during the summer months at which law
teachers assemble and engage in the process of cross-fertilization.
The law schools can provide the sponsorship for conversations in
depth by law teachers in regard to the implications of change for
the teaching of law and its demands upon and for a philosophy of
law adequate to give guidance to law teaching and practice.
The second freedom here suggested is the freedom to involve
the law school in the processes of law in ways other than preparing
lawyers-to-be for admission to the profession. A philosophy of law
which accentuates the law process of ordering society may put in
question the accustomed stance of the law school in remaining somewhat aloof from societal processes except for the published writings
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of individual legal scholars. Such a philosophy may suggest that the
law school has a responsibility for collective action in the political
and social life of the community. The inclusion of a course in legal
philosophy oriented toward process and change in the law school
curriculum may entail involvement by the law faculty in ways not
altogether within the patterns of past behavior. It is recognized
that there is an element of activism in this suggestion. Perhaps this
activism is one of the differentiating aspects of the new philosophy
that is taking form. It may reflect a change in the understanding
of human purposive effort in a time when man can effectuate his
plans within known limits of probable success.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it has been argued that the time has come to
recognize that the philosophies of law which provided the base for
the teaching and practice of law during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries are not adequate for the current time. Man has increased
his control over the environment in which he lives and his powers
for making decisions to plan and implement the structures for social
life in accord with values deemed important enough to preserve.
A new legal philosophy is needed which accounts for the changes
that are incumbent upon the law-professionals in an industrialized,
bureaucratized, urbanized, and secularized society.
In the context of these changes, the lawman is more than a
dispenser of law rules; he is a participant in the creation of social
order and his function as a professional takes on new dimensions
from those of the past. The criteria for deciding between alternative
means and goals now require examination; the lawman needs to
understand the norms and the bases by which he sets the order for
the future.
The law school is in a strategic position to develop, articulate,
and implement a philosophy of law adequate for the task of
lawmen in contemporary society. However, the place of legal philosophy in the law school curriculum will depend upon that philosophy and the source from which attention to the problem is derived.
In this matter, the impetus needs to come from the law schools.

